Liao: Efficient Breach in the Common European Sales Law

EFFICIENT BREACH IN THE COMMON EUROPEAN
SALES LAW
Wenqing Liao
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 336

I. EFFICIENT BREACH IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ........ 340
A. A Seller's Efficient Breach ................................................... 340
B. Efficient Breach, Negotiation and Remedies ........................ 344

C. Implications for the Structure of Contract Remedies Rules . 348
II. APPLICATION OF THE EFFICIENT BREACH DOCTRINE
IN THE GENERAL RULES OF THE CESL ........................... 351
A. Seller's Breach and Buyer's Remedy in General ................. 352
B. Damage Rules ....................................................................... 355
C. Rules in the Efficient Performance Zone .............................. 358
D. Rules in the Efficient Breach Zone ....................................... 359
1. When Will Contracts Fall into the Efficient Breach
Zone? ............................................................................ 359
2. The CESL 's Reaction to Contracts with the Efficient
Breach Zone .................................................................. 363
III. EFFICIENT BREACH IN SPECIFIC CASES OF
CONSUMER CONTRACTS .................................................... 367
A. Hypothesis ofEfficient Non-Delivery or Delayed Delivery . 368
B. Hypothesis ofEfficient Non-Conformity (Defective
Performance) ...................................................................... 369
C. Limits of the Application ofEfficient Breach in Consumer
Contracts ............................................................................ 372
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................ 376

t Wenqing Liao is present at the Maastricht European Institute for Transnational
Legal Research (METRO) of the Law Faculty of Maastricht University in the Netherlands.
Her research is supported through a scholarship of the China Scholarship Council (CSC). I
am grateful to participants at the METRO seminar for their useful comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
Published by SURFACE, 2014

1

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2014], Art. 4

336

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41 :2

INTRODUCTION
Against a background where trade is growing and becoming
more complicated in modem society, private parties are appealing for
more flexibility and freedom in making decisions rather than strictly
abiding by the documents they have signed. Correspondingly, the
traditional study of contract law has embraced more theoretical
resources rather than insist on the traditional conception that breach of
the contract is wrong. The school of law and economics, with its
efficient breach theory, provided a new approach to explaining contracts
and breaches, and challenged the traditional notion of pacta sunt
servanda 1 and the moralistic nature of obligation. 2 In 1897, Justice
Holmes wrote in his well-known book The Path of the Law, "[t]he duty
to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it, and nothing else." 3 Afterwards, this
conception of contract became a dynamic support for the theory of
efficient breach, which is assumed to have first appeared in Birmingham
(1970)4 and received its name from Goetz & Scott (1977). 5
At the early stage, after the theory was born, it worked on one
hand, on a superficial layer as a descriptive concept for a situation
where breach of a contract would be profitable for the party who
breached after placing the non-breaching party in as good a position as
he would have occupied had the contract been performed. 6 In this
situation, breach of contract, compared to performance, would make the
promisor better off without making the promisee worse off. Hence,
performing the original contract is assumed to be economically
undesirable for the society. On the other hand, grounded in the theory
of efficient breach, early scholars focused on the justification of EB and
the doctrine's contributions to the structure of contract law and contract
1. "Pacta sunt servanda" is Latin for "agreement must be kept".
2. Frank Menetrez, Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. REV. 859, 860 (2000); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE, ATHEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1- 6 (Harvard Uni. Press 1981 ).
3. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897).
4. Robert R. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damages Measurex and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).
5. Charles J. Goetz et al., Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 5
COLUM. L. REV. 554, 555 (1977).
6. Some scholars call the theory a simple efficient breach model, which makes a
comparison between the cost of performance and the expected benefit. See, e.g., Ian R.
Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 94 7, 949 ( 1982).
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remedies. They asked whether or not breach is immoral and what the
rules of contract law should be so as to provide incentives to parties to
breach efficiently. It was proposed that the contract remedy rules
should encourage breach when breach is efficient, but discourage it
otherwise. 7
The EB doctrine, in its simplest form, stops here and has been in
debate since it first appeared in academic work. For instance, it is stated
that the theory of efficient breach is cultivated in a simple and shortterm mind without the consideration of long-term interests from
cooperation. On the other hand, people argue that the moral and ethic
factors contained in contract obligations have been ignored. 8
Furthermore, the significant disconnect between the theoretical
hypothesis and legal realities put those early findings into plight. 9 After
almost forty years of controversy, the topic of efficient breach has
essentially lost its attraction in the normative construction of contract
rules. 10 Since 2000, many scholars have raised radical attacks against
this doctrine and suggested it be ended. 11 The plight of efficient breach
theory also indicates the problems embedded in the law and economic
analysis. As Posner indicated, the law and economic analysis of the last
decades, has almost stayed at establishing economic models without
explaining the existing law or examining the practical matters. As a
result, the analysis has failed to produce a real economic theory of
contract law and cannot provide a solid basis for criticizing and
reforming contract law. 12 Starting from this point, this paper will not
keep on building ideal efficient breach models, but it will set the
efficient breach theory against the background of real law and analyze

7. Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory
of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 343 (1984).
8. See, e.g. Dawinder S. Sidhu, A Crisis of Confidence and Legal Theory: Why the
Economic Downturn Should Help Signal the End of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach, 24
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 357, 397 (2011).
9. Id. at 393.
10. Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTRACT LAW 2-29 (Gregory Klass, G. Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228072 (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
11. Sidhu, supra note 8, at 360.
12. "In the last ten years, theory has become divergent, and impasses have emerged.
The simple models that dominated discussion prior to the 1990s do not predict observed
contract doctrine. The more complex models that emerged in the 1980s and dominated
discussion in the 1990s failed to predict doctrine or relied on variables that could not, as a
practical matter, be measured. As a result, the predictions of these models are indeterminate,
and the normative recommendations derived from them are implausible. " See Eric A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112
YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003).
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whether this doctrine can be promoted in the existing rules.
Another premise set in the beginning of this paper concerns a
trend toward forming the Common European Contract Law. This
development, also referred to as the Europeanization of contract law,
was created by a number of factors including the increasing crossborder trade across the common European market, efforts from scholars,
the European Union and the common law. Although some critical
voices also arise, questioning the necessity and possibility of this
undertaking of unification, 13 the topic of Europeanization is still being
developed in both academic work and real practice for the purpose of
achieving greater coherence and a more general common European civil
law. In the present stage, the harmonization of European private law
has gained great achievement, focusing on contract law, especially on
sales contracts and consumer law. A recent achievement was presented
as the publication of the European Proposal on Common European
Sales Law 14 by the European Commission on October 11th 2011, which
was largely based on the Draft Common Frame of Reference 15 and the
previous Principles of European Contract Law 16 ("PECL" 1994). As is
indicated in the beginning of the CESL, the purpose is to improve the
conditions for the establishment and the functioning of the internal
market by making available a uniform set of contract law rules. 17 Based
13. For example, the Tiebout argument in favor of legislative competition provides a
strong argument for decentralization of European law. As is pointed out, legal diversity
contributes to the competition among different legal systems and in that sense increases the
quality of law. Moreover, the "transaction costs" argument that has been pointed out by the
traditional literature in favor of Europeanization has also been challenged. On the one hand,
the cost of Europeanization is assumed to surpass the benefit brought out by this
undertaking and on the other hand, the cost of transactions incurred by cultural, social or
economic factors is thought to be larger than that is incurred by legal diversity. For more
information about the debate on Europeanization and decentralization, see Michael. G.
Faure, How Law and Economics May Contribute to the Harmonization of Tort Law in
Europe, in GRUNDSTRUKTUREN DES EUROPAISCHEN DELIKTSRECHTS 31 (Reinhard
Zimmermann ed., 2003).
14. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11, 2011). The
CESL is comprised of three main parts: a Regulation (hereinafter Reg. CESL), Annex I to
the Regulation consisting of the contract law rules (hereinafter CESL), and Annex II
containing a Standard Information Notice.
15. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRlVATE LAW: DRAFT
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE, OUTLINE EDITION (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009)
[hereinafter DCFR].
16. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PART I (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds.,
vol. I, 1995); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LA w: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh
Beale eds., 2000); PRINCWLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PART 3 (Ole Lando et al. eds.,
2003) [hereinafter PECL].
17. Reg. CESL, supra note 14, art. I.
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on this goal, the CESL provides a set of standard terms for cross-border
sales covering contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or
transferred and contracts for the supply of digital contents, as well as the
service contracts related to the sales contracts. 18 Moreover, emphasis is
placed specially on offering a specific, largely protective sales regime
for consumers and small medium sized entrepreneurs ("SME"), 1 for
whom negotiations about the applicable law are less possible.
Putting those two contexts together, the concern of this paper will
be merely placed on the substantive content of those contract rules,
which have been drafted in the CESL. The paper will answer to what
extent efficient breach doctrine can be promoted within the content of
the CSEL. Moreover, efficient breach in the past, to a large extent, is
only considered as a seller's breach and has been analyzed within the
context of general sales contracts. The scope of this paper, however,
will be narrowed down to the consumer contract in which one of the
parties is a natural person and acting for purposes which are outside his
trade, business, craft or profession. Following this logic, the structure of
the contracts ("contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or
transferred") includes a business seller (or a producer), a consumer
buyer, a duty to convey a property (or to produce a good) and a price. 20
As is inferred from the doctrine of efficient breach, the primary
issue driving the introduction of efficient breach theory is the situation
where strictly performing the original contract is economically
inefficient. To deal with this situation, the seller can choose to break
the contract, or negotiate with the buyer or make a possible substitutive
performance. Breach and compensation of the non-breaching party is
just one option that a seller may choose and discussion about this issue
can fit into a broader framework of law and economic analysis of
contract law in which the basic hypothesis is that contract actors are
rational and welfare max1m1zers. By the same token, the theory of
18. See id. arts. 4-5.
19. CESL has made a clear differentiation between a trader and a consumer. As is
given in Article 2 of the CESL Regulations, a "'trader' means any natural or legal person
who is acting for purposes relating to that person's trade, business, craft, or profession." Id.
art. 2(e). A "'consumer' means any natural person who is acting for purposes[,] which are
outside that person's trade, business, craft, or profession." Id. art. 2(t). In addition, Article
7 of the CESL Regulations defines a small medium sized enterprise as "a trader which (a)
employs fewer than 250 persons; and (b) has an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50
million or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million, or, for an SME which
has its habitual residence in a Member State whose currency is not the euro or in a third
country, the equivalent amounts in the currency of that Member State or third country." Id.
art. 7, § 2.
20. In this section, the words "seller" and "buyer" will also be used in the same
meaning as the words of"promisor" or "debtor" and "promisee" or "creditor."
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efficient breach may be applied to consumer contracts based on the
assumption that both consumers and traders engage in contracting
behavior to enhance their welfare which is measured by either wealth or
happiness. Each party to the contract expects to receive more than he or
she relinquishes. 1 Starting from this cognition, the discussion about
efficient breach in this paper will focus on the CESL rules in relation to
the situation where strictly performing the original contract is
economically inefficient but neither party to the contract prefer welfaredecrease. In this sense, the doctrine of efficient breach provides a
viewing point to make the economic analysis of the substantial rules of
the CESL. To make this evaluation, Section 2 of this paper will first
summarize what has been achieved in law and economic literature and
establish the basic benchmarks for evaluating remedy rules.
Afterwards, the general remedy system in EU sales contract law will be
discussed in Section 3. In addition, the doctrine of efficient breach will
be discussed. Although it has been discussed widely, in prior literature
it was limited to the simplest model of non-performance. To overcome
this problem, Section 4 will analyze the applicability of efficient breach
under the context of specific types of breach.
I. EFFICIENT BREACH IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

The terminology of efficient breach, which appeared in the
literature, was used on the basis of general contracts. This section will
give a brief introduction to the doctrine of efficient breach and assess
what it can contribute to the structure of contract law, especially for the
contract remedy rules.

A. A Seller's Efficient Breach
The classical statement of efficient breach was indicated in
Birmingham 1970 "repudiation of obligations should be encouraged
where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his
promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had
performance been rendered. " 22 Around the same time, another paper by
Scott and Goetz first used the concept of efficient breach. 23 Afterwards,
this concept was largely cited as the basis for the common law remedy

21. See Jan M. Smits, Party Choice and the Common European Sales Law, or: How to
Prevent the CESL from Becoming a Lemon on the Law Market 8-9 (Maastricht European
Private Law Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2012/13, 2012), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2060017 (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
22. Birmingham, supra note 4, at 284.
23. Goetz et al., supra note 5, at 557-59.
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of expectation damages. 24 Under this concept it is required that the
breacher pay damages in an amount that would make the victim of
breach as well off as she would have been had the breach not
occurred. 25 The reason is given as "if the promisor is willing to breach
and pay damages equal to the promisee' s lost surplus, he must be
earning a surplus from breach that is greater than the surplus yielded
from performing the contract. 26
A party to a contract, therefore, is induced to breach as long as
he is able to retain the remaining part of the profits yielded by his
breach after compensating the expected loss of the other party. By this
way, if a contract turns out to be disadvantageous or wasteful after its
formation, the promisor to this contract can be released from it by
paying damages rather than by seeking a successful renegotiation;
similarly, if and only if a contract stays valuable, the promisor will
complete it as agreed. 27 Moreover, in the case that one party breaks a
contract, the non-breaching party is entitled to expectation damages so
that he will be in the same position as if there had been performance.
Therefore, the non-breaching party will be indifferent between having
the breacher breach and pay damages or having the breacher perform
the contract. 28 This situation is in accordance with the Potential Pareto
Improvement (or Kaldor-Hicks improvement). 29
Another inference derived from the early study of efficient
24. Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract. Remedies- Efficiency, Equity, and the
Second "Restatement", 81 COLUM. L. Rev. 111, 111 (1981).
25. Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1679, 1680 (2008).
26. David W. Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory, 6
S. CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J. 397, 425 (1997-1998).
27. Id.
28. Richard Craswell defined the Indifference Principle as: "the stated goal of contract
damages is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the
defendant kept his contract." Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the
Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. Rev. 629, 636 (1988).
29. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 47 (6th ed. 2011). The
potential Pareto efficiency is the modification of Pareto efficiency. The later one refers to a
movement that makes at least one person better off and nobody worse off. It requires the
gainer explicitly compensate the loser in any change. If there is no payment, the loser can
veto any change. So any change is only possible by unanimous consent. However,
according to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, if a movement creates a winner and a loser but the
winner can compensate the loser and still have some gain left, then the movement is
efficient. Breach of a contract can be Kaldor-Hicks Efficient, but not Pareto Efficient. The
breach may create a loser (promisee) although it can generate a higher surplus and enhance
the net welfare. Therefore, only if the breacher can still be better off after he fully
compensates the other party's loss, the breach will eventually create a Pareto Efficient state.
It is noted that the compensation by a contract-breacher should place the victim in the
position that he would have been in had the contract been performed. Id.
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breach doctrine was the critiques over penalty clauses (or punitive
damages) that are created deliberately over-compensatory by the parties
so as to deter breach or ensure performance. The penalty clauses, which
are mostly created through a damage agreement (liquidated damages
clauses) between the parties, are accused of causing a problem of
overcompensation and deterring efficient breach. 30 That is, a promisee
that is subject to penalty clauses will be motivated to take undue
precaution and to always perform the contract in fear of paying penalty
damages. 31 This idea has been incorporated into some courts' opinions
in the U.S. One such case, Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Justice & Childers,
states "contractual terms fixing damages in an amount clearly
disproportionate to actual loss seek to deter breach through compulsion
and have an in terrorem effect: fearing severe economic loss, the
promisor is compelled to continue performance, while the promisee
may reap a windfall in excess of his just compensation. 32
Two simple models have been established for explaining the
efficient breach theory. Suppose a contract, which is assumed to be
advantageous to the parties at the time of contract formation. 33 After
the contract is signed, a number of unspecified contingencies arise in
the ongoing contract relationship, which might change an advantageous
contract into a disadvantageous contract. When a contingency increases
the performance cost so that performing the oringinal contract will
decrease the profits earned by the contract parties, the promisor will
choose to breach the contract in order to avoid the cost of performance.
This is referred to as an unfortunate contingency. In addition, after the
formation of a contract, if an external buyer comes, willing to pay a
price which is much higher than that of the oringinal buyer, the seller
will be motivated to breach in order to earn more surplus. This is a
fortunate contingency. 34
The following are examples of a fortunate contingency and an
unfortunate contingency: Suppose Y agrees to produce a car and sell it
to X at a price of €10,000. Suppose at the time when X and Y enter the
contract, Y estimates the production cost of the car will be €5,000 but X
estimates he can resell the car for €15,000. Two situations might
30. Juan P. Moreno, The Efficient Breach Hypothesis: Its Impact and Effect on the
Penalty Clause as Defined under Colombian Law, 1 ILL. Bus. L.J. 4, 5 (2010).
31. See Goetz et al., supra note 5, at 556.
32.
Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 677 (2001).
33. At the time two parties enter a contract, both of the parties consider performance of
the contract as efficient, otherwise the parties would not sign the contract.
34. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 325-26.
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happen after the formation of the contract. First, it might be an
unfortunate contingency that increases the production cost (for
concreteness, I will use PC to describe it) to €16,000. 35 Or, second, it
might be a fortunate contingency that offers the seller Y another trading
opportunity. Assume that Z approaches Y and explains that he
desperately needs this car and he would pay €20,000. Suppose the car is
worth €25,000 for Zand the highest price he would bid is €25,000.
Tables 1 and 2 indicate each party's surplus in the case when the
performance cost increases and when a third party places a higher value
on the car provided that perfect expectation damages can be awarded. In
the first case, Y is supposed to be better off if he tries to seek a lease
from performance by paying €15,000 as compensation rather than
investing €16,000 in producing the car. Moreover, the buyer X may
keep a fixed surplus of €5,000 no matter whether or not the contract is
performed as long as a compensatory damage measure is available. In
this sense, it is possible to reach a Pareto Efficiency through Y's nonproduction and avoid the decrease in the total surplus. Similarly, when
the second scenario occurs, breaking the original contract and
transferring the car to the alternative buyer may bring out a higher
surplus of €20,000 than transferring the car to the original buyer does.
Breach is efficient.
T able 1. Surp l us ofE ac hP arty Iif PC mcreases 36
y
Total
PC=16,000
Y's decision x
-€1,000
-€6,000
€5,000
Expectation Perform
damages
€5,000
-€5,000
Breach

35. These two examples are modified from the examples that have been used by
Cooter and Ulen. See id. at 326-31. Similar examination can be found in Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the
Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALL. REV. 975, 998-1015 (2005).
36. We use "N" to indicate the net profit, "p" to denote performance and "b" to denote
breach. If Y performs the contract, each party's profit is calculated as: Npx=€15 ,000€10,000=€5,000; Npy=€10,000-€16,000= -€6,000. If Y decides not to perform, then each
party's surplus is measured as: Nbx=€15,000-€10,000=€5,000; Nby=O-Nbx=0€5,000=€5,000.
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Table 2. Surplus of each party if a third
• 37
price
y
x
€15,000 €5,000
Value
Expectation Y sells the €5,000
€5,000
car to X
Damages
€10,000
Y sells the €5,000
car to Z

party bids a higher

344

z

Total

€25,000
0

€10,000

€5,000

20,000

B. Efficient Breach, Negotiation and Remedies
As is indicated in the previous examples, the primary issue that
motivates the scholars to talk about efficient breach theory is how to
deal with the situations where breach of the contract will be more
efficient than performing the contract. To deal with this situation, the
parties have multiple solutions, either ex-ante or ex-post.
Through ex-ante negotiation, the parties can specify each other's
rights and obligations in reaction to the possible uncertainties, such as
writing a price reduction clause in case of a sharp increase in
performance cost. Or they can decide how to react to those
contingencies by ex-post renegotiation after disputes arise and try to use
a more efficient contract to replace the previous one. 38 For example,
after a second bargainer comes to a party to a contract, all the parties
involved in this transaction may gather together and re-negotiate the
price. Through this approach, a bidding war may occur and thus prevent
the promisor from implementing the less efficient contract. Or, if a
seller fails to sell a product to the buyer who values it more, 39 this buyer
can transact with the buyer who received the product. In this way,
resources will also be allocated to the best user in the end. What's more,
since the parties are the best judge of their own benefits, the approach of
ex-ante or ex-post negotiation may always achieve an efficient result.
37. When Y performs and the car is sold to X, each person's profit can be calculated as
this: the Npx= €15,000-€10,000==€5,000; Npy==€10,000-€5,000==€5,000; Nz=O;
Npx+Npy+Nz==€5,000+€5,000+o==€10,000. If Y breaches and resells the car to Z, then the
net profits are calculated: Nbx= l5,000-10,000=5,000; Nby= (€20,000-€5,000)-( €15 ,000==€10,000;
Nz=€25,000-€20,000==€5,000;
€10,000)
Nbx+Nby+Nz==€5,000+€10,000+€5,000==€20,000.
38. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 326.
39. For example, a buyer who values a property less might have already recieved the
goods according to the property law. For instance, in many civil law countries, registration
is an important requirement for obtaining ownership over real property. Suppose there are
two people who want to buy a house. If the first buyer has done the registration in the
public authority, the second buyer cannot get the property, even if he is willing to pay a
higher price.
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However, ex-ante or ex-post negotiations might fail for several reasons.
The trading parties' limitation of foresight may prevent contract parties
from predicting all the possible events and writing a complete contract
ex-ante; or the costs of negotiation and the conflicts in the parties'
interests might sometimes discourage a successful renegotiation. In this
sense, there is some space for legal rules, especially remedy rules,
which may fill up the contract gaps and offer the conflicting parties a
legal basis for solving the problem.
Within the framework of legal rules, nevertheless, different options
are available for achieving an efficient consequence. Or in other words,
legitimating breach and issuing expectation damages is far from the
only way to avoid performance of an inefficient contract. In the simple
efficient breach doctrine, the assumption that the approach of breach is
economically efficient is based on two conditions: (1) the expectation
damages may motivate those behaviours which will increase the total
surplus created in the transaction (Nb =O or €20,000 > Np=-€1,000 or
€10,000); and (2) the non-breaching party is able to get full
compensation (L= €5,000). Nevertheless, a similar result may be
realized as long as the seller is not forced to strictly perform the original
contract when a fortunate contingency or an unfortunate contingency
occurs. For instance, even if the default remedy is specific performance,
avoidance of an inefficient contract is still available. On the one hand,
the parties may negotiate with each other in order to reach a desirable
solution. When an unfortunate contingency arises, the seller might be
willing to pay the buyer up to €5,999 for a release from the contract
rather than loss €6,000 in producing the car; or the buyer would accept a
price higher than €5,000 for the buyer's non-performance. 40 On the
other hand, the law may set some exceptions to specific performance in
reaction to the situation where performing the contract turns out to be
socially inefficient. This refers to the impractical doctrine dealing with
"the circumstances in which a party's performance is physically
possible but will cause severe hardship". 41 Moreover, the goal of full
compensation could be also, or even better, accomplished through the
remedy of specific performance. Especially, when the subject of a
contract is a unique good or subjective values have been attached to a
contract, it is difficult for a court (a third party) to use the baseline of
"market price difference" or "lost profits" to assess the amount of

40. Klass, supra note 10, at 13.
41. Donald J. Smythe, Impossibility and Impracticability, in CONTRACT
ECONOMICS 2011, at 207 (6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECON., 2nd ed., 2011).
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compensation. 42 In those cases, either determining the baseline for
evaluating the subject of the contract is complicated or finding a
substitution in the market is impossible. In addition to these two
concerns which may influence the efficiency of the result, if more than
one approach would lead to a similar result, then the difference in
efficiency of the rules is related to the transaction costs under different
rules. 43 Contractual parties are supposed to prefer the approach which is
less costly so that their net profits from transactions are maximized.
Therefore, if a contract dispute has been brought to a court, then the
problem that should also be recognized is the level of transaction costs
facing the plaintiff and the defendant under different remedy rules, 44
such as the cost of litigation, the cost of assessing damages or the cost
of execution.
Beyond the worries within the expectation damages, questions
arise as to the effect of punitive damages in relation to the possibility of
efficient breach. In contrast to the traditional concerns about penalties'
deterrence to efficient breach, my argument is that damages stipulated
by parties have advantages in inducing rational decisions, precluding
conflicts or costly litigation and allocating risks. Behavioural
experiments and economic assumptions about rational theory add much
more force to support this statement. For example, as is shown in either
Gneezy & Rustichini' s Day-care Centre Study ( 1998)45 or WilkinsonRyan' s observation of Sick-leave Case in the Boston Fire Department
42. A non-breaching party's expectation loss can be calculated as the market price
difference or the value difference. When a buyer breaches, the expectation loss of the seller
is normally calculated as the discrepancy between the market price at the time when the
breach occurs and the contract price. When a seller breaches, the expectation loss of the
buyer is normally calculated as the difference between the contract price and the value that
the buyer places on the contract-for goods. However, if the buyer has a substitutive offer
after the breach happens, then what he has lost is the discrepancy between the price set in
the substitutive contract and the price set in the original contract. For instance, suppose a
contract to produce a product. If the parties agree on a price of €10,000 at the time of
contract formation and the production cost is estimated to be €5,000, then the expected
surplus of the producer is €5,000. Assume that the parties also learn that the market price for
this product is assessed as €12,000. In this case, the expectation loss will be €2,000. COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 29, at 309-10; Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 991.
43. Macneil, supra note 6, at 957.
44. Ulen, supra note 7, at 369.
45. In 1998, Gneezy and Rustichini made the famous study of the "day care centre" in
Israel. They researched the relationship between a penalty and the possibility that parents
pick up their kids late. A result is found that the number of late-coming parents increased
significantly after a monetary fine is attached to the behavior of coming late. As is
explained, introduction of a fine may remove the non-market nature that actors place on
being late. Actors are willing to treat a fine as a price for being later and no guilt or shame
will be attached to the act of buying a commodity. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A
Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
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(2001 - 2002)46 , it is found that people's behaviour becomes more
strategic and self-interested when the punishment of uncooperative
behaviour (late coming, sick-leaving) has been clarified. 47 The reason,
given by those observers, is that actors are more likely to deny social
norms and moral concerns of complying promises and be more selfseeking when there is an explicit and real penalty for non-cooperation.
48
Therefore, efficient breach will be promoted rather than be deterred
when there is an explicit arrangement of contract damages. Moreover,
within the dimension of rational theory, it is inferred that the permission
of penalty clauses would encourage other rational behaviour beyond
efficient breach. An example is that offering contract parties more
freedom in drafting damages clauses would promote risk-allocation and
"a penalty clause may represent the best effort of the parties to allocate
risk" 49 because people would carefully stipulate the amount of
compensation in relation to each party's risk attitude rather than agree
on an amount which is unreasonably high. If the seller is risk-averse, the
seller would prefer a kind of damage payment that will guarantee him a
fixed profit and is unaffected by neither the performance cost nor any
outsider's offer. 50 The seller would not accept any damage measure that
is higher than the expected loss suffered by the buyer and penalty
clauses will not be drafted into the contract. In another case where a
seller is risk-preferring or risk-neutral and a buyer is risk-averse, the
parties might use a high amount of damages to shift the risk of nonperformance from the buyer to the seller. 51 However, it is hardly for the
46. "In December of 2001, the Boston Fire Department changed its sick-leave policy
to allow fifteen sick days per year. The previous system had allowed unlimited sick time,
and the new rule was part of an initiative to bring professional management tools to the
department. In 2001, firefighters took a total of 6,432 sick days. In 2002, the total number
of sick days rose to 13,431 - more than double the previous year." Tess Wilkinson-Ryan,
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 633, 635 (2010).
47. Daniel Houser et. al., When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions
and Non- Cooperation, 62 GAMES ECON. BEHAVIOR 509, 522-23 (2008).
48. DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 705; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 664.
49. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 644.
50. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 706 (1986).
51. The risk-averse buyer is willing to pay a premium in advance so as to shift the risk
to the seller. So he would accept to pay a higher amount of contract price. See id. at 705-06.
As is stated:
If the seller is risk neutral and the buyer is risk averse, it is beneficial to both parties
for the seller to insure the buyer.... Damages in excess of full compensation would
not appeal to a risk-averse buyer because he would face an unwanted variation in his
income, depending on whether the product failed . He would not wish to pay a higher
price for the product. . . . If the buyer is risk preferring, a clause that specified
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parties to reach an extremely high amount of damage payment which is
only aimed for punishing breach provided the process of contracting is
based on equal condition. In one aspect, the party who bears a risk of
paying penalty damages would require a higher price to cover any
increase in the cost of performance. 52 The higher the amount of
damages, the higher the price the buyer has to pay. So the buyer has no
incentive to require unreasonably high damages. In another aspect, there
is rare example in the commercial context where a seller is in favour of
risk or gambling and would accept an unreasonable penalty clause.

C. Implications for the Structure of Contract Remedies Rules
Put all those questions together and the simple efficient breach
theory is not as convincing as what was assumed in the early stage. As
shown in the previous section, a single expectation damages rule may
not reach the ideal result which is consistent with the efficient breach
model. Moreover, social or economic factors other than the threat of
legal liability will also influence the possibility of efficient breach, such
as the fear of losing reputation or the long-term benefit in cooperation.
Today, few scholars are in favour of the simple efficient breach
doctrine. However, the doctrine of efficient breach is still valuable in
the sense that it opens a window for evaluating contractual behaviour
and assessing legal remedies in a wider perspective. In response to the
unspecified risks arising after the contract formation, the efficient
breach doctrine is an optional approach that would be taken by
legislators and contract parties. In this paper, three implications of
efficient breach theory on contract remedy rules are drawn.
One of the most important implications is that by differentiating
an efficient performance zone (or inefficient breach zone) and an
efficient breach zone (or inefficient performance zone), the doctrine
makes us re-think the behaviour that either falls into the efficient breach
zone or into the efficient performance zone. 53 Take the previous case set
in Section 2.1 as an example; the efficient breach point is where the
production cost increases to €15,000 or the external bidder values the
car for €15,000. If the production cost increases to higher than €15,000,
damages in excess oflosses would provide an opportunity to gamble.
Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 147, 152 (1984).
52. Kornhauser, supra note 50, at 720.
53. Gerrit De Geest, Specific Performance, Damages and Unforeseen Contingencies in
the Draft Common Frame of Reference, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DCRF: THE WORK
OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT GROUP WITHIN CoPECL N ETWORK OF EXCELLENCE 123, 126-27
(Filomena Chirico & Pierre Larouche eds., Munich: Sellier 2010).
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the entire surplus produced by the original contract will be consumed by
the increasing production cost and the contract will tum into the
efficient breach zone. Within the efficient breach zone, breach would be
efficient because it produces higher surplus than performance does for
the society. In another sense, a slight increase in performance cost (for
example, PC=€1000) would not necessary denote an efficient breach.
Moreover, breaches in reality actually involve other types of costs such
as the litigation cost, cost of damage calculation and the loss of
reputation and future trading opportunities, other than the cost of legal
liability. 54 Thus, when, and only when the extent of the increase is clear
and well beyond the normal range, performance of the contract will
become inefficient. By the same token, only when a second buyer
comes with a price which is much higher than the value that the first
buyer would pay, does breach of the original contract fall into the
efficient breach zone. 55 In addition, another interesting topic arousing
quite a lot of discussions in law and economics refers to the concept of
opportunistic breach. A breach is deemed as opportunistic when "oneparty attempts to reap the benefit of the bargain without bearing the
agreed-upon cost". 56 For example, a seller may appropriate all the prepayment by the buyer and invest the money in other uses without
providing reciprocal performance. 57 We may want the law of contracts
to discourage this type of breach and consider depriving the actor of all
the benefits he could obtain from the opportunism.
Another lesson we can learn from the efficient breach theory is that
remedies for breach may have multiple influences over the whole
transaction. One important example is that the contract remedy has an
influence on a person's breach-or-perform decision. By realizing this,
we can better evaluate how contract remedies would affect people's
incentives to behave intentionally. 58 To promote efficient breach and
avoid wasteful performance, the contract law should create incentives to

54. See id.; HANS-BERND SCHAFER & CLAUS OTT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CIVIL
LAW 320-24 (Matthew Braham trans., Edward Elgar Puhl 'g 2004).
55. Or a second seller is willing to accept a price which is much lower than that the
lowest price the first seller would accept.
56. Klass, supra note 10, at 10.
57. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-19 (8th ed. 2011 ).
58. For instance, Barnes observes that the efficient breach theory is an example that
scholars study the relationship between damages rules and surplus-increasing breach. See
Barnes, supra note 26, at 398 ("The topic of greatest scholarly interest, judicial notice, and
casebook teaching is the effect of rules on incentives to break promises intentionally .. .
Economists conclude that contract damage rules tend to provide incentives to breach
contracts that align the self-interested preferences of a person contemplating breach with
society's interest in ensuring that its scarce resources are used wisely.").
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breach in the circumstances where breach may lead to a higher sum of
surpluses than that yielded by performance and vice versa. On the one
hand, the law should not force a promisor to strictly perform the original
contract in the situation when a contract falls into the efficient breach
zone. It does not necessarily require that expectation damages should be
set as the default remedy. On the other hand, the remedy rules should be
able to protect the expectation interest of the promisee, namely, to put
the promisee in the same position as she would have been had the
contract been performed.
The third point, that we can infer from the efficient breach doctrine
is related to the freedom in contracting and renegotiation. As is noted,
breach and compensation is the second-best tool for welfare
maximization in many occasions. A more desirable approach to
achieving an efficient result derives from private negotiation. After all,
contract parties are better than courts or legal scholars at assessing their
own preferences and working for their own welfare. They know more
about how to deal with risks in their transactions, which kind of
breaches are clearly efficient and should be priced rather than punished,
through which remedy they can avoid inefficient breach more cheaply
and so on. 59 We want the law to facilitate parties' ex-ante and ex-post
contracting. One important point is to diminish mandatory rules in
contract law and give parties more freedom in choosing their own
remedies. For example, courts should reduce inference with liquidated
damage clauses. Rather than scrutinize over the amount of damages
stipulated by contract parties, a more preferable way for courts is to
evaluate the formation process of those clauses.
Based on those three points, this paper will address some
specific questions in relation to the application of efficient breach
theory in the CSEL. With regard to the general case of breach and
remedy, it is necessary to figure out the line between the efficient
breach zone and the efficient performance zone drawn by the CESL and
the CESL' s approach to dealing with the situation where a contract falls
into each zone. In addition, the findings deriving from the study of the
general breach case will be put in the context of specific breach cases in
order to examine the possibility of different types of efficient breach.

59. Klass, supra note 10, at 24.
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II. APPLICATION OF THE EFFICIENT BREACH DOCTRINE IN
THE GENERAL RULES OF THE CESL
As shown in the previous section, one important topic driving
the discussion of efficient breach theory arises from the situations where
breach of the contract is more efficient than performance. Using the
economic surplus standard, a contract either falls into the efficient
breach zone or into the efficient performance zone. According to
economic theory, contract law should aim to optimize the contracting
parties' incentives to take efficient actions, or to facilitate their abilities
to maximize welfare from transactions. 60 It is assumed, based on this
insight, that contract law should be able to motivate contract parties to
avoid strict performance of a contract when it falls into the efficient
breach zone, but encourage performance otherwise.
The proposal for regulation defines the CESL' s scope to sales
contract, covering contracts for transferring ownership of goods and
contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced. As is
noticed, one important feature of the sales contracts shaped by the
CESL is the sharp distinction made between the business contracts
(hereinafter B2B contracts) and the consumer contracts (hereinafter
B2C contracts). However, the fundamental structures of these two types
of contractual relationships are quite similar. Both the consumer party
and the business party engage in transactions for their own profits, as a
result of which, contracts entered into voluntarily by the parties will
lead to welfare enhancement. 61 In the absence of a fully complete
contract, 62 potential risks or opportunistic behaviour may arise in the
contractual relationship and thus decrease or eliminate the utility of the
contract. There are several factors leading to the incompleteness of a
contract, such as the transaction costs 63 , or the limited foresight of the
60. Cf Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
law, 113. YALE L.J. 541 , 544 (2003).
61. Smits, supra note 21, at 6.
62. Assume a complete contract. Then the trading parties have to consider every risk,
consequence, possible opportunistic behaviour of the other one, etc. ("contingently
completeness"). Correspondingly, the contract should specify the exact actions that one
party should perform when every risk happens. For example, it should include the time,
place, way and quality of performance ("obligationally completeness"). See Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,
101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992).
63. In order to draft a complete contract, the trading parties have to take all the
potential risks into account and deal in their contract with all of the risk in a specific way.
Drafting complete contracts incurs the cost of searching information, the cost of negotiation
and so on. Hence, a low possibility risk or insignificant risk may always be neglected by the
contracting parties. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
299-301 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
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parties. Moreover, the risk of opportunism increases in consumer
contracts caused by consumers' lack of information, the absence of a
truly competitive market or even the standard form contracts that are not
subject to negotiation. 64 As a result, the contract that was assumed to be
efficient at the time of conclusion may tum out to be wasteful because
the cost of implementing the original contract increases or businesses
may opportunistically try to cut down the investment in the performance
of a binding contract. Taking those concerns into account, there is space
for introducing legal interference into consumer contracts in order to
shape the parties' incentives to taking proper behaviour, for instance, to
motivate a business party to comply with what he has agreed. What is
debatable, however, is the desirable extent of legal interference. Applied
to consumer contracts, if the law imposes a high requirement for
performance on the business party, this would be converted into the
price of the product or shrink the supply of products and hence to a
decrease in social welfare. 65
This section will discuss the general attitude taken by the CESL
toward breach, remedies and efficient breach zone.

A. Seller's Breach and Buyer's Remedy in General
The central concept stressed in this paper refers to "breach".
However, instead of using the concept of "breach", the CESL uses the
term "non-performance" to include any failure to perform a contract
obligation, regardless of whether the failure is excused. 66 Part IV of the

64. In a normal case, the consumer contract is presented as a standard form contract in
which the consumer cannot negotiate individually but can only "take it or leave it". As is
argued by Slawson, infra, about 99% of consumer contracts are standard form contracts. In
economic theory, standard contracts are preferable for the concern of lowering transaction
cost. As to the consumer contract, which occurs at regular basis, it is costly for the business
to negotiate with consumers individually. However, in another sense, consumers are
compelled to adhere to the standard terms in the contract and the situation for the consumer
is worse off if the business tries to exploit economic benefits without bearing any cost. See
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts . and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Cf Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer
Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. Rev. 583, 594-608
(1990).
65. Smits, supra note 21, at 9.
66. The term of "non-performance" instead of "breach" has also been used in PECL,
as well as subsequent European soft law texts. For example, Chapter 8 of PECL provides
rules on "Non-Performance and Remedies in General"; Chapter III of Book III of DCFR
offers the rules about "Remedies for Non-performance". In the CESL, Chapter 11 addresses
"the buyer's remedies" and chapter 13 addresses "the seller's remedies". PRINCIPLES,
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 15; PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LA w, supra note 16; Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, supra note 14.
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CESL sets out the framework of the contractual parties' obligations and
remedies. Cases of breach might be presented either as a business
seller's breach or a consumer buyer's breach. This section will focus on
the basic structure of a business seller's breach and a consumer buyer's
remedies as indicated in the CESL.
Article 87 of the CESL includes two major types of a seller's
non-performance, covering the situations where a seller fails to deliver
the goods ("non-delivery") or the goods delivered are not in conformity
with the contract ("non-conformity"). Breach of an obligation is the
condition for awarding a consumer remedies. Generally, a consumer
buyer is provided with a set of standard remedies in Article 106. 67 As is
indicated, in the case that a breach takes place, a consumer buyer may
require: (1) Performance (including specific performance, repair or
replacement); 68 (2) Withholding the buyer's own performance 69 (usually
payment of money); (3) Terminating the contract; 70 (4) Declaring a
price reduction71 ; or (5) Claiming damages. 72
Moreover, Article 106 contains important information for the
consumer party, namely that the consumer is provided with a free
choice of remedies and Article 108 adds mandatory nature to the
general application of remedies rules in B2C contracts 73 On the one
hand, it means that a consumer buyer may either choose among any of
the remedies listed in Article 106, or resort to more than one remedy in
67. CESL, supra note 14, art. 106, §§ 1, 3.
68. Id. art. 110, §1 (entitling the buyer to require performance of the seller's
obligations).
69. Id. art. 113, § 1 (stating that a buyer who performs at the same time as, or after, the
seller performs, has a right to withhold performance until the seller has tendered
performance or has performed).
70. Id. art. 114, §§ 1, 2 (stating that a buyer may terminate the contract within the
meaning of Article 8 if the seller's non-performance under the contract is fundamental
within the meaning of Article 87; in a consumer sales contract and a contract for the supply
of digital content between a trader and a consumer, where there is a non-performance
because the goods do not conform to the contract, the consumer may terminate the contract
unless the lack of conformity is insignificant).
71. Id. art. 120, §1 (stating that a buyer who accepts a performance not conforming to
the contract may reduce the price; the reduction is to be proportionate to the decrease in the
value of what was received in performance at the time performance was made compared to
the value of what would have been received by a conforming performance).
72. CESL, supra note 14, art. 159, §§1, 2 (stating that a creditor is entitled to damages
for loss caused by the non-performance of an obligation by the debtor, unless the nonperformance is excused; the loss for which damages are recoverable includes future loss
which the debtor could expect to occur).
73. Id. art. 108 (stating that in a contract between a trader and a consumer, the parties
may not, to the detriment of the consumer, exclude the application of this Chapter, or
derogate from or vary its effect before the lack of conformity is brought to the trader's
attention by the consumer).
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the same case as long as the remedies he chooses are not incompatible.
For instance, if a buyer chooses to terminate a contract, it means the
bond created by the contract will be brought to an end and he cannot ask
for repair or replacement. On the other hand, the consumer's free
choice is not subject to cure by the seller, which is stated in
Article106(3). 74 Article 109 follows by specifying that the "cure" by a
seller in the case of "non-conformity". As is shown, a seller whose
early tender was not in conformity with the contract may make a new
and conforming tender within the time allowed for performance or cure
the defect at its own expense even after the time allowed for
performance. 75 The buyer may terminate the contract if the nonconformity amounts to being fundamental. 76 This is the normal case in
commercial sales, where both the seller and the buyer are professional
businessmen, but not in the B2C contract. The message conveyed in
Article106(3) is that a consumer buyer has great freedom in choosing
remedies. He may require the seller to either repair the defects in the
goods he received or change the defective goods into conforming goods.
But more importantly, the consumer is able to tum down any offer by
the seller to cure so as to require price reduction, damages, or
termination of the contract immediately. 77 The application of the
remedy is at the consumer's choice. Furthermore, Article 114 adds that
consumers may terminate the contract even when the lack of conformity
is not fundamental, enhancing a consumer's free choice of remedies.
Meanwhile, the application of a consumer buyer's remedies is
mandatory so that the parties may not exclude it or derogate from or
vary its effect in advance. However, the consumer's free choice of
remedies is not absolute. The type of remedies that are available to a
consumer buyer depends on the specific type of breach. Following
Article 106, the CESL adds more provisions, coordinating the
74. Id. art. 106, §3 (stating that "if the buyer is a consumer: (a) the buyer's rights are
not subject to cure by the seller ... ").
75. Id. art. 109, § 1 (stating that "a seller who has tendered performance early and
who has been notified that the performance is not in conformity with the contract may make
a new and conforming tender if that can be done within the time allowed for performance").
76. Id. art. 114, § 1 (stating that "buyer may terminate the contract within the meaning
of Article 8 if the seller's non-performance under the contract is fundamental within the
meaning of Article 87 (2)").
77. See CESL, supra note 14, art. 114, §2; see also Gerhard Wagner, Buyers'
Remedies under the CESL: Rejection, Rescission, and the Seller's Right to Cure (Apr. 5,
2012), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Wagner%20paper.pdf (last
visited Mar. 26, 2014) (presentation at the University of Chicago to Host Conference on
European Contract Law); see also Regine Feltkamp & Frederic Vanbossele, The Optional
Common European Sales Law: Better Buyer's Remedies for Seller's Non-performance in
Sales of Goods?, 6 EUR. Rev. PRIV. L. 873, 894 (2011).
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application of different types of remedies in specific types of breach,
which will be discussed in Section 4.
B. Damage Rules

As to the damages rules, the CESL has a separate part (Part VI)
covering the issue of damage measurement, types of damages and
conditions for damages.
Following the CISG and the DCFR, 78 the CESL also sets the aim
of damages as compensatory; namely, it aims to make a non-breaching
party indifferent to breach and performance of the contract. 79 As Article
160 indicates, "the general measure of damages for loss caused by nonperformance of an obligation is such sum as will put the creditor into
the position in which the creditor would have been if the obligation had
been duly performed, or, where that is not possible, as nearly as possible
into that position." Article 160 also adds that the damages cover the
loss which the creditor has suffered and the gain of which the creditor
has been deprived, which includes a future loss caused by the breach of
contract. Inferring from Article 165 of the CESL, a creditor's loss from
non-performance is generally measured by the discrepancy between the
contract price and the market price. But Article 164 adds that if the
creditor has arranged an alternative transaction to replace the original
transaction reasonably, he could recover the shortfall between the value
of what would have been payable under the terminated contract and the
value of what is payable under the substitute transaction. 80 Suppose the
buyer has arranged an alternative sale in which he paid a price (P ')
higher than the contract price (P); what he can then recover on the basis
of Article 164 is the discrepancy between P' and P, namely P' -P. A
problem occurs in the situation where the buyer has arranged a cheaper
substitutive transaction (P'<P). In addressing the principle of "full
compensation", the commentary to the CESL states that "if the
creditor's loss is higher, he retains the right to recover the loss through a
claim for damages on the basis of Article 159."81 However, in the case
where a buyer could arrange a cheaper alternative purchase, the buyer
actually suffers no loss and cannot obtain any compensation. As is
shown, the CESL tries to entitle a creditor to his real loss rather than to
78. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
arts. 74-5, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter CISG]; see also DCFR, supra note
15, bk. III, sec. 3-702.
79. COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW (CESL) COMMENTARY, 639-40 (Reiner Schulze
ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft et al., 2012) [hereinafter CESL COMMENTARY].
80. See CESL, supra note 14, arts. 164-65.
81. See CESL COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 652.
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motivate the creditor to make the best possible substitutive transaction.
The CESL, moreover, sets several limits and conditions on the
expectation measure as well. First, not all types of loss are recoverable.
Article 2 of the CESL specifies the losses that are recoverable by
limiting them to economic loss and non-economic loss in the form of
physical pain and suffering. Other forms of non-economic loss such as
impairment of the quality of life and loss of enjoyment are precluded
from recovery with emphasis. The second limit to expectation damages
derives from the famous Hadly rules 82 , namely, a debtor is only liable
for losses that he could foresee or could be expected to have foreseen
when the contract was concluded as a possible consequence of his
breach. 83 This is in accordance with one of the requirements needed for
an efficient breach to take place. As is assumed, the debtor to a contract
has to obtain sufficient information concerning the cost and the benefit
of breach in order to assess whether it is more profitable to breach, to
perform, or to negotiate with the other party. The Hadly rule builds a
bridge between the debtor's incentive to breach and the creditor's
incentive to disclose information in terms of his expected loss from the
non-performance of the contract. Since the damages are limited to the
loss that is foreseeable by the debtor at the time of contract conclusion,
the buyer has to disclose as much information as possible at the stage of
contract formation in order to fully recover his loss from the nonperformance. Another condition for awarding expectation damages is
the causal relationship between nonperformance and loss. However, the
CESL doesn't establish any standard for evaluating this causal
relationship. 84
In addition, the CESL exempts the debtor from
compensating the loss to the extent that the creditor contributed to the
non-performance or its effects, or the creditor omitted reasonable steps
82. The Hadley Rule derives from the famous English case of Hadley v. Baxendale,
(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.); 9 Exch. 341. Two implication were drawn from this
case:
( 1)[T]hat it is not always wise to make the defaulting promisor pay for all the damage which
follows as a consequence of his breach, and (2) that specifically the proper test for
determining whether particular items of damage should be compensable is to inquire
whether they should have been foreseen by the promisor at the time of the contract.
As is suggested, the "foreseeability" test is subject to defining what a hypothetical
reasonable man would have foreseen at the time he signed the contract. See L. L. Fuller &
William R. Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 84-85
(1936).
83. CESL, supra note 14, art. 161.
84. The commentary under Book III, §3-701 of the DCFR provides a basic standard
for evaluating causation between non-performance and loss. As is required, the creditor can
only recover the losses that would not have occurred without the failure in performance.
DCFR, supra note 15, bk. III, sec. 3-701, comment B.
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to reduce the loss. 85
The CESL is silent in terms of the party-designed damages for
the seller's non-performance. In the previous example, both PECL and
DCFR take a similar approach toward party-designed damages as that
of the "Resolution on Penalty Clause" (RPC 1971 ). 86 The attitude is to
distinguish normal liquidated damages from pure penalty clauses.
Liquidated damages, which are higher than the damages payable for
breach, are generally allowed and enforceable. But in the situation
where the damage clause has specified an excessive amount of damages
disproportionate to the actual loss from non-performance, the court is
authorized to reduce the sum of damages. The CESL, in contrast,
doesn't incorporate this kind of rule. The CESL's concentration on
regulating "unfair contract terms" in B2C contracts or B2B (SMEs)
contracts to some extent is relevant to its silence in addressing the rule
on liquidated damages or penalty clauses. In the context of a consumer
contract, the contract usually takes the form of a standard contract
drafted only by the business party and the consumer may either "agree
or leave". Logically, the business party would not specify any damage
clause against his own interest. Rather, the problem in standard contract
terms arises from the business' advantageous position in drafting unfair
terms that are unfavorable to the consumer, such as penalty clauses for
consumers' non-performance. The business party has the incentive to
insert an unfair penalty clause as long as his marginal cost of doing so is
lower than the marginal value. 87 Then a desirable way of eliminating
unfair penalty terms is to invalidate them. Article 85 of the CESL
indicates that "a contact term is presumed to be unfair if its object or
effect is to. . .(e) require a consumer who fails to perform obligations
under the contract to pay a disproportionately high amount by way of
damages or a stipulated payment for non-performance . . . ." If the
damages clause is presumed unfair, it is not binding on the consumer
party unless the business can prove it is not unfair. 88 By default, it is
inferred that the CESL allows general liquidated damages but only
excludes penalty clauses against consumer parties that have failed the
85. CESL, supra note 14, arts. 162-63.
86. Resolution (78) 3 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,
Relating to Penal Clauses in Civil Law art. 7 (1978). "The sum stipulated may be reduced
by the court when it is manifestly excessive. In particular, reduction may be made when the
principal obligation has been performed in part. The sum may not be reduced below the
damages payable for failure to perform the obligation. Any stipulation contrary to the
provisions of this article shall be void." Id. Similar articles are §9:509 PECL, supra note 16,
and Book III, sec. 3-702 ofDCFR, supra note 15.
87. Meyerson, supra note 64, at 606-07.
88. CESL, supra note 14, arts. 79, 83, 85.
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"Unfair Contract Terms" test.
C. Rules in the Efficient Performance Zone
In economic theory, actors engage in contracting in order to
enhance their welfare, thus the law should motivate the parties to
comply with their agreement. Accordingly, breach of a mutually agreed
upon contract should be refrained from unless performance of the
contract would decrease the social welfare. Within a trade between a
business and a consumer, the seller is motivated to comply with the
contract consciously, by either the goal of earning money, his personal
values, or as a means to protect his professional reputation. 89 Moreover,
legal rules encourage performance in the efficient performance zone by,
for instance, imposing obligations on the contracting parties and
creating remedy rules for a non-breaching party that may increase the
cost of breach and alter a promisor's incentive to breach. The CESL
adopted this notion of encouraging the performance of those contracts
within the efficient performance zone.
A general issue stressed in relation to the efficient performance
zone concerns the remedies that are available to the buyer. According
to Article 106 of the CESL, a hierarchy does not exist among those
remedies. Within the five types of remedies provided by the CESL,
performance is regarded as an important remedy arising from nonperformance but not as the primary one. 90 Article 106( 1) and
Article 110( 1) set the general provisions entitling a buyer to
performance, including claiming specific performance, repair of the
goods, or replacement of the goods. Basically, if a seller fails to deliver
the goods or the goods delivered are not in conformity with the contract,
the buyer may ask for delivery, repair or replacement unless some
specific conditions set out in the CESL are satisfied. 91 Provided that the
performance claim is available to the buyer, the seller's principal
reaction to a contract will not be to breach, but rather to comply with the
contract or negotiate with the buyer in order to buy the nonperformance. Moreover, what motivates the seller to perform at an
optimal level is a whole system composed of both legal and non-legal
incentives. 92 Within the legal system, remedies beyond specific
89. Schafer & Ott, supra note 54, at 277.
90. Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at 891-92.
91. Section 3.4, infra, will discuss the exceptions to the claim of specific performance.
92. In terms of non-legal incentives, reputation and economic surplus may induce
performance. For example, the seller is willing to perform in order to obtain reciprocal
performance by the buyer; or he has to keep his promise in order to sustain a good
reputation within the common playing field. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60, at 557-
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performance and damages may also provide such deterrence to nonperformance. For example, by withholding the obligation to pay, the
buyer can, on the one hand shift away the risk of losing the value of his
monetary payment if the seller fails to perform93 and on the other hand,
induce the seller to accomplish due performance since the seller expects
economic surplus from the payment.
Within the efficient performance zone, Article 89(1) of the CESL
recognizes a situation where performance of a contract has become
more onerous, but the surplus from performance is still assumed to be
higher than that from non-performance under the heading of"Change of
Circumstances". Article 89 also provides two types of contingencies
which may cause onerosity in performance, namely, an increase in the
cost of performance, or a decrease in the value of what is to be received
by a seller. Nevertheless, to be mentioned, the seller's obligation to
perform the contract in general will not be affected if the extent that
performance becomes more onerous is not great. In this sense, if a
seller refuses to deliver the goods as required, or delivers defective
goods merely on the ground of a minor difficulty in performance, the
buyer may still make a claim for remedies including requiring
performance. 94
D. Rules in the Efficient Breach Zone

Following the theory of efficient breach, a contract falls into the
efficient breach zone when an unexpected contingency arises so that the
performance of the contract will create less profit than the breach does.
As is noted in Section 2, either a drastic increase in performance cost, or
an extremely high bid by a third party may bring a contract into the
efficient breach zone. In the efficient breach zone, performance of the
original contract should be refrained from so as to avoid economic
waste and to enhance the total welfare that the contract parties obtain.
Two questions will be stressed in this section: (1) When does a contract
fall into efficient breach zone?; and (2) How does the CESL deal with
the situations when the contract is in the efficient breach zone?
1. When Will Contracts Fall into the Efficient Breach Zone?

The CESL provides three examples where a seller's obligation to
perform will be influenced, by the doctrine of efficient breach: ( 1)
58.
93. CESL COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 514.
94. CESL, supra note 14, art. 89. More discussion about Article 89 will be presented
in Section 3.4.1, infra.
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"Excused Non-performance," (2) "Change of Circumstance" and (3)
"Impossibility or Impracticability."
First, Article 88 provides the doctrine of "Excuse,"95 referring to an
impediment which is beyond the non-performing party's control, and
where that party could not be expected to have taken the impediment
into account at the time when the contract was formed, or to have
avoided or overcome the impediment or its consequences. 96 However,
the CESL doesn't give further explanation of prerequisites for "excused
non-performance" or show any examples which may be recognized as
these kind of impediments. The situation described in Article 89 can
also be covered by the civil law principle of "Force Majeure," 97 which
is widely used in literature. 98 The requirements for recognizing force
majeure can be traced back to the previous documents that Article 88 of
CESL is based on. For example, the ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003
sets out that: ( 1) the impediment must be out of the debtor's control, or
not fall in the sphere of risk of the debtor; (2) it must have been
unforeseeable at the time of contract formation; and (3) it or its
consequences must have been unavoidable. It lists some typical events
that amount to impediments, such as war, natural disasters or acts of
terrorism. In addition, the commentary below Book III, Section 3: 104
of DCFR provides some examples to show when an obstacle should be
recognized as an insurmountable impediment that is outside of the
debtor's control and could not been taken into account by the debtor.
95. Article 79(1) of CISG, Article 8:808(1) of PECL 1999 and Book Ill, Section 3104( 1) of DCFR 2008 are practically similar to Article 88( 1) of CESL.
96. CESL, supra note 14, art. 88, § 1.
97. Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Proposed Common European Sales Law and the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 44 UCC L.J. 457, 469-71 (2012).
98. The principle of force majeure originated in the French Civil code of 1804. See
CODE CIVIL [C. C1v.] art. 1148 (Fr.) ("There is no occasion for any damages where a debtor
was prevented from transferring or from doing that to which he was bound, or did what was
forbidden to him, by reason of force majeure or of a fortuitous event."). International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International Commercial
Contracts,
169
(1994),
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles l 994/l 994fulltext-english.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2014) [hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES]. There are also other terms to
describe similar supervening events that make contract performance impossible. For
instance, the English law principle of "frustration" or German law principle of
"impossibility". In many situations, those terms are used interchangeably, except for some
subtle difference. For instance, the English principle of frustration has a broader meaning,
including that "which renders the contract something radically different from that which was
in the contemplation of the parties." See Peter Mazzacano, Force Majeure, Impossibility,
Frustration & the Like: Excuses for Non-Performance; the Historical Origins and
Development of an Autonomous Commercial Norm in the CISG, 2 NORDIC J.C. L. 38, 3845 (2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l982895 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014); see also
HUGH BEALE ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONTRACT LAW 1106 (2d. ed. 2010).
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As is shown, an unexpected strike in the nationalised company which
distributes natural gas can be recognized as out of the control of a
debtor who only heats its furnaces with gas. 99 An earthquake is also
considered as an impediment since it is insurmountable or irresistible
unless the debtor can build a virtual fortress. In those cases, "one
cannot expect the debtor to take precautions out of proportion to the
risk," 100 hence, the impediment or its consequence cannot be overcome
or avoided and strictly performing the contract is impossible.
The CESL also contains a separate provision on "change of
circumstance", namely Article 89 which derives immediately from the
DCFR and the PECL. 101 As noted in Section 3.3, whether or not a
debtor's obligation of performance is affected depends on what extent
that performance has become more onerous. Article 89 indicates a
situation under the name of "an exceptional change of circumstance."
An exceptional change of circumstance makes performance excessively
onerous, because the cost of performance has increased or the value of
what is to be received in return has diminished to a large extent.
However, Article 89 doesn't draw a clear line between the situation
where "performance becomes more onerous" and the situation where
"performance becomes excessively onerous." It merely indicates that
the excessive onerosity is caused by "an exceptional change of
circumstances," which is also an ambiguous terminology. The task of
distinguishing an exceptional change of circumstance from simple
changes in the surrounding conditions of a contract is left to judges in
individual cases. Another name which is more commonly used by
scholars to denote the situation depicted in Article 89 is "hardship." 102
Different from force majeure, performing the original contract is only
excessively onerous, but physically possible, when the principle of
"change of circumstance" or "hardship" applies. It might be a great
99. DCFR, supra note 15, at 809.
100. See De Geest, supra note 53, at 128; see also DCFR, supra note 15, at 810.
101. The identical article in DCFR is Book III, Section 1-110 and in PECL is Section
6: 111. Conversely, the CISG, upon which both the PECL and DCFR were drawn, includes
both the force majeure and "change of circumstance" in the same Article: 79. As is indicated
by some scholars, the approach taken by the CISG is preferable, because it is difficult to
draw a distinction between "force majeure" and "hardship". Many subsequent events, as is
argued, will just make performance more onerous, rather than render it impossible.
Meanwhile, the prerequisites for both cases are the same. Therefore, to some extent,
hardship is just one situation of force maj eure and should be regulated in the same provision
covering the later case. Schwenzer, supra note 97, at 470.
I 02. See id.; see also Hector L. MacQueen, Change of Circumstances: CJSG, CESL
and A Case From Scotland, 11 J. INT'L TRADE L. & PoL'Y 300, 300 (2012); Ulrich Magnus,
CJSG and CESL, in LIBER AMICORUM OLE LANDO, 225, 251 (Michael Joachim Bonell et al.
eds., 2012).
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fluctuation of price in the material market that raises the seller's costs of
production greatly, for instance, to 200%. 103 In such a situation,
producing the commodity as required by the contract is still possible,
but the increased costs will consume all the profits that may be created
by the contract and thus performance of the contract is economically
inefficient. Except for "being exceptional", a "hardship" is recognized
only when three prerequisites are satisfied. Article 89(3) requires that
the change of circumstance should occur: ( 1) at the time after
conclusion of the contract; (2) when its possibility or scale could not
have been taken into account by the debtor; and (3) when the risk of it
has not been assumed by the aggrieved party or cannot reasonably be
regarded as having been assumed. 104 Apply those conditions to a
consumer contract. Changes of circumstances in relation to matters
within the area of professional expertise may normally be precluded
from the scope of Article 89. As a professional, the business seller is
considered to have assumed or should have assumed risks arising out of
his profession. 105
In addition to Articles 88 and 89, which are included in the general
chapter of obligations and remedies, what should be mentioned as well
is Article 110(3), which puts forth two exceptions to the remedy of
specific performance. Two cases are recognized where a buyer cannot
require specific performance. The first case refers to a situation where
performance of the contract is impossible or has become unlawful.
Another one occurs if the burden or expense of performance would be
disproportionate to the benefit that the buyer would obtain. 106
Situations embodied in Article 110(3) are recognized in relation to the
of
"impossibility"
or
traditional
contract
law
theory
"impracticability." 107 With regard to assessing when performance of a
contract is impractical (or uneconomic), the standard adopted in Article
103. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales
Contracts, 39 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 709, 715-17 (2008) [hereinafter
Schwenzer, Force Majeure].
104. CESL, supra note 14, art. 89, § 3.
105. This has been clearly stressed in the commentary ofDCFR.
106. CESL, supra note 14, art. 110, § 3 (stating that performance cannot be required
where: (a) performance would be impossible or has become unlawful; or (b) the burden or
expense of performance would be disproportionate to the benefit that the buyer would
obtain).
107. As to the "impossibility principle", it covers not only physical impossibility, but
also legal impossibility. However, more information about when and how performance
should be judged unlawful cannot be found in the CESL. It leaves us to wonder which law
should be applied to make this judgment. For instance, will performance of a contract be
rendered unlawful if it violates mandatory rules in the national laws and regulations? See
Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at. 897.
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110(3), which is grounded on the comparison between the costs of
performance and the benefit that a buyer will obtain, is analogous to the
requirement for the situation where efficient breach arises because of an
unfortunate contingency. Performance of a contract is rendered
impractical if the cost of performance exceeds the benefit that the buyer
can obtain from it. In other words, an impractical contract may fall into
the efficient breach zone where performance of the contract is
inefficient. In contrast to Article 88 and Article 89, Article 110(3) has
not set any prerequisite for the cause of impossibility or
impracticability. Hence, even if a situation of impossibility or
impracticability is induced by some events that are expectable or
controllable to the seller, Article 89 may apply as long as the
performance becomes impossible or extremely costly; meanwhile, the
CESL is chosen by the contracting parties.
To summarize, situations where a sales contract may fall into the
efficient breach zone have been recognized by the CESL. With regard
to the type of contingency rendering a contract economically inefficient,
the CESL only includes unfortunate contingencies which have increased
a seller's cost of performance or decreased the benefit that the seller
may obtain in return. The general qualification for this type of
contingency is based on a "cost-benefit" rule of comparing the cost or
burden of performance and the cost incurred by non-performance. A
contract falls into the efficient breach zone only when its performance
becomes impossible or is excessively costly. As a result, the seller's
obligation of performance will be influenced. Nevertheless, the CESL
doesn't specially mention the circumstance where non-performance is
motivated by the higher surplus yielded from contracting with a third
party. Even if a third party bids a price that is much higher than the
highest price offered by the buyer, the seller's obligation of
performance will not be affected and he must perform his obligation as
required by the contract. 108
2. The CESL 's Reaction to Contracts with the Efficient Breach Zone

When a contract falls into the efficient breach zone, there are two
basic conditions for qualifying the sellers breach as an efficient breach.
First of all, the law should not force the seller's to perform the contract
so that the seller is able to make free choice of breach, performance or
offer to negotiate. Moreover, the buyer should not be worse off on
account of the seller's non-performance. This would be possible if the
buyer's expectation interest is protected through the award of
108. CESL, supra note 14, art. 89, § 1.
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expectation damages. 109 Then, questions arising in relation to the CESL
are whether the CESL allows non-performance or not, and if so,
whether it entitles the aggrieved buyer to the claim of expectation
damages or not.
Concerning the situation of force majeure, the CESL follows the
traditional doctrine by exempting the seller from liability for nonperformance. The general rule of excuse for non-performance is drafted
in Article 88. Moreover, Article 106(4) adds information on the effects
of excuse by extending excuse to damages claims and performance
claims. 110 Other remedies remain available to the buyer. 111 Therefore,
in the case of force majeure, a buyer may still withhold his payment,
claim price reduction, or termination of the contract except for requiring
specific performance and damages. Paragraph (3) of Article 88 further
specifies an obligation of notification by the party who is unable to
perform. After the seller is aware or could be expected to have been
aware of an impediment, he has to give notice to the buyer of this
impediment and its effect without any undue delay. The text of the
CESL also clearly indicates the sanction for violation of the duty to
notice by holding the party liable for any damages incurred from his
failure to give notice. 11
Rather than directly allowing non-performance, the CESL
imposes a duty to renegotiate on the contract parties in the case of
hardship. As is set in Article 89(1 ), when performance becomes
excessively onerous, the parties have to enter into negotiations in order
to adapt or terminate the contract. Following the previous DCFR, 113
Section (2) of Article 89 carries the idea of encouraging re-negotiation
further. 114 If the parties fail to reach an adaptation or termination of the
109. Qi Zhou, Is a Seller 's Efficient Breach of Contract Possible in English Law,
SELECTEDWORKS (2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/qi_zhou/l (last visited Feb.
19, 2014).
110. Magnus, supra note l 02, at 251.
111. CESL, supra note 14, art. 106, §4 (stating that if the seller's non-performance is
excused, the buyer may resort to any of the remedies referred to in paragraph 1 except
requiring performance and damages).
112. Id. art. 88, §3. The party who is unable to perform has a duty to ensure that
notice of the impediment and of its effect on the ability to perform reaches the other party
without undue delay after the first party becomes, or could be expected to have become,
aware of these circumstances. The other party is entitled to damages for any loss resulting
from the breach of this duty. Id.
113 . DCFR, supra note 15, bk. III,§ l-110(3)(d).
114. CESL, supra note 14, art.8912. If the parties fail to reach an agreement within a
reasonable time, then, upon request by either party a court may: (a) adapt the contract in
order to bring it into accordance with what the parties would reasonably have agreed at the
time of contracting if they had taken the change of circumstances into account; or (b)
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contract within a reasonable time, a court or arbitral tribunal can do so
upon the request of either the seller or the buyer. 115 Two general
restrictions are set in relation to the adjustment of the contract by a court
or arbitral tribunal in Article 89(2). First of all, the court or arbitral
tribunal cannot decide to adjust the contract without any request of
either party. Only if the parties cannot negotiate successfully within a
reasonable time and one of the parties makes a request to the court or
arbitral tribunal for a solution, may the court adapt or terminate the
contract. 116 Secondly, the CESL requires that the adaption should be
made from the perspective of the contracting parties, namely, it should
be "in accordance with what the parties would reasonably have agreed
at the time of contracting if they took the change of circumstances into
account." In brief, although Article 89 doesn't expressively allow nonperformance, its clarification of the parties' duty to renegotiate as well
as a possible adjustment of the contract to hardship implicitly interferes
with any direct claim for specific performance of the contract by the
buyer.
In addition to invoking Article 89 to defend against a buyer's
performance claim, the seller may also resort to Article 110(3) to avoid
performing the contract if performance has become excessively
burdensome or costly. As Article 110(3) provides, performance cannot
be required if it is objectively impossible or legally impossible, or it
incurs excessively high costs or burdens. 117 Implicitly, application of
exceptions to performance, which is based on the balance between costs
and benefits, should be applied to two other forms of performance,
namely, repair and replacement. If cure is impossible or the cost or
burden of cure exceeds what a buyer can benefit from it, the seller may
decline the buyer's request of cure. Nevertheless, the CESL has not
exempted a debtor from damages when performance is impossible or
impracticable. Article 159 entitles a creditor to any damages for loss
caused by non-performance of an obligation by the debtor, with the only
exception in the situation where the rule of force majeure applies and
terminate the contract within the meaning of Article 8 at a date and on terms to be
determined by the court. Id.
115. See Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at 891 ; see also Schwenzer, supra
note 97, at 4 71.
116. See MacQueen, supra note 102, at 301.
117. See DCFR, supra note 15 (goes a step further by specifying the consequence if a
creditor insists on specific performance; DCFR III. 3:302 (5) indicates that a creditor cannot
recover damages for loss or a stipulated payment for non-performance to the extent that she
has increased the loss or the amount of payment by insisting unreasonably on specific
performance in circumstances where the creditor could have made a reasonable substitute
transaction without significant effort or expense).
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the debtor's non-performance is excused. 118
From the above statements, three primary conclusions can be
drawn. First, specific performance is generally not allowed if contracts
fall into the efficient breach zone where performance is impossible or
impracticable. Second, with regard to the issue of damages, whether or
not the buyer is able to obtain damages depends on the cause of nonperformance. In principle, a buyer is still entitled to damages when he
is not able to claim for specific performance of the contract. However,
where the non-performance is caused by an impediment that the seller
did not expect and did not assume the risk; the procedure of
renegotiation should be intrigued.
Furthermore, if this kind of
unexpected impediment is uncontrollable and unavoidable or could not
be overcome by the debtor, the creditor cannot ask for damages because
non-performance is excused. In other words, the idea implied in the
damages rule is to correlate the possibility of damages to the allocation
of risk. The CESL makes the debtor who assumed the risk of
impediment take the risk and pay damages to the other party. If the
seller is risk neutral, he is indifferent to risk and should assume the risk
of non-performance after the conclusion of the contract. By awarding
expectation damages, the CESL removes the risk of non-performance
from the buyer and shifts it to the seller.
Nevertheless, nonperformance will be excused in the circumstance where the seller has
not assumed the risk. Third, cooperation and renegotiation is generally
encouraged within the efficient breach zone. Some special obligations
or rules have been established by the CESL in order to promote the
communication and cooperation between contract parties. On the one
hand, the debtor who has been influenced by a force majeure event is
imposed of an obligation to inform, upon which the other party may
understand the situation and take appropriate measures without any
delay. For instance, the creditor may negotiate with the debtor to either
adapt or terminate the contract or to arrange a substitute sale to reduce
the loss incurred by non-performance. On the other hand, Article 89(2)
directly puts forth the parties' duty to negotiate within a reasonable time
and the possibility of a court or an arbitral tribunal's adjustment of the
contract in light of a hardship. However, imposing an obligation to
renegotiate and permitting a court to adjust the contract also gets some
critiques from scholars. For instance, as is pointed out, "allowing the
court to directly interfere in the content of a contract is a serious
challenge to the principle of party autonomy and the pacta sunt servanda

118. CESL, supra note 14, art. 159.
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rule." 119 Moreover, creation of a duty to negotiation and a mandatory
renegotiation period is accused of being unnecessary. The reason, as is
given, is that the parties already have a strong incentive to renegotiate
and settle disputes because settling is cheaper than going to a court. 120
Nevertheless, the rule on renegotiation will just intervene with the
parties' freedom in choosing between renegotiation or going to trial
directly. 121
III. EFFICIENT BREACH IN SPECIFIC CASES OF CONSUMER
CONTRACTS
It was shown in Section 3 that the CESL partially absorbs what
has been derived from the law and economic analysis of efficient
breach. Although the CESL doesn't directly use the terminology of
efficient breach, the idea of differentiating the efficient breach zone and
the efficient performance zone, based on the balance between costs and
benefits of performance is present in it. What may lead a contract to fall
into the efficient breach zone is only an unlucky impediment that
increases a seller's performance cost or decreases the value of what he
is assumed to receive in return. In those situations, a claim of specific
performance is not allowed even though it is possible for a buyer to
require damages unless the seller's non-performance is excused. The
amount of damages that a buyer obtains should be equal to the amount
that will put the buyer into the position he would have been in if the
contract had been duly performed. Theoretically, efficient breach is
possible within the framework of the CESL.
Those findings can also applied to specific cases of consumer
contracts. In consumer sales, if the seller's breach can generate more
profit than performance does and bring no loss to the buyer, the breach
is economically efficient and should not be condemned. This is the
ideal model. In specific cases, a seller breaks the contract in different
ways. The seller might refuse to deliver the goods, or the delivery
might be finished after the time required for performance, or the goods

119. F eltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at 891.
120. See De Geest, supra note 53, at 132-33.
121. Id. De Geest states: "(T)he likely effects of a duty-to-renegotiate are usually (a)
that court decisions are delayed, because when a party comes to the conclusion that
settlement is not possible (for instance, because parties have different expectations as to
what the court will decide, so that there is no 'settlement range'), she still has to wait until
the mandatory renegotiation period is over before going to court; and (b) that parties are
obliged to play a you-quit-first game in which they have to try to make the other party leave
the negotiation table first, so that the other one is held responsible for the failure of the
negotiations."
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offered might be in conformity with the contract. Under the general
provisions covering breach and remedies, the CESL recognizes two
major forms of non-performance and provides corresponding remedy
rules.
A. Hypothesis ofEfficient Non-Delivery or Delayed Delivery

The first case of non-performance that is present in the CESL is
non-delivery or delayed delivery of the goods. Suppose a case of nondelivery. If we apply the findings in Section 3 to the specific case,
efficiency is realized if the seller is not forced to deliver the goods and
the buyer's position will not be worse off when the contract has fallen
into the efficient breach zone.
An important condition for making efficient non-delivery is that
the contract has fallen into the efficient breach zone recognized by the
CESL. That is, the delivery of the goods is either impossible,
impracticable because the cost or burden of delivery increases
dramatically, or the value of the payment decreases to a great extent.
For example, the earthquake destroyed all the products so that the seller
is unable to provide the products as required or it would be extremely
expensive for the seller to find alternative products. Nevertheless, a
more profitable opportunity from a third party's offer will not affect a
seller's obligation to deliver the goods. The seller still has to deliver the
good to the original buyer as is required by the contract even if selling
the goods to a third party may create higher surplus. To be noted,
efficient non-delivery would only happen to the contracts that involve
future performance. 122 Within the passage of time between the
exchange of promise and the delivery, unexpected contingencies may
arise and increase the cost of delivery or render delivery impossible. To
the contrary, discussion of efficient non-delivery doesn't make sense in
the case of simultaneous exchanges where delivery of the goods
happens at the same time the contract is concluded. Suppose the
contracts happening on a regular basis, such as the purchase in grocery
shops or eating at restaurants. Products are delivered as long as a
consumer finishes a series of behaviour, such as picking up items and
making payment at the cash desk. In those cases, the contract is
performed at the same time as the contract is concluded.
122. As is indicated by Cooter & Ulen, there are three models of promise: ( 1) "one
party pays now for the other party's promise to deliver goods later ('payment for a
promise'); (2) one party delivers goods now for the other's promise to pay later ('goods for
a promise'); and (3) one party promises to deliver goods later and the other party promises
to pay when the goods are delivered ('promise for a promise')." COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 29, at 283.
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According to the CESL, a seller is generally not forced to make
delivery if the contract has fallen into the efficient breach zone
recognized by it. In this case, the seller is free to choose the welfare
maximizing breach.
As to the remedies available to the consumer
buyer, what he may claim depends on whether or not the seller's nondelivery is excused. If the intervening event amounts to force majeure
covered by Article 88, the seller is exempted from non-delivery and the
buyer cannot claim for damages, but can withhold payment of the price,
terminate the contract, or reduce the price. 123 But since delivery of the
goods as required is impossible because of the force majeure, the
consumer in theory may not resort to price reduction. He is able not
only to refuse to pay for the goods, but also to terminate the contractual
relationship and claim his money back if he has already made the
payment. As a result of termination, the contractual relationship of the
parties will end and any benefit that a party had received from the other
party returned. 124 In other cases which fall outside the scope of Article
88, the seller is not excused from non-delivery and the consumer is
entitled to expectation damages in addition to the rights to withhold his
payment and to terminate the contract. 125 The amount of damages that a
consumer may obtain is equal to the benefit that he would get had the
product been delivered, 126 namely, the value that was placed on the
product at the time the contract was formed. In this sense, the consumer
may balance the remedies available and choose either to terminate the
contract or to make a claim for damages. Thus, non-delivery will only
happen if it is impossible or it is more profitable than delivery after the
seller compensates the consumer's expectation losses.
B. Hypothesis ofEfficient Non-Conformity (Defective Performance)

Suppose another circumstance of non-performance which happens
frequently in real life, namely, a seller has delivered the goods, but the
goods delivered are not in conformity with the contract. This situation
is also referred to as defective performance. It is assumed that the
contract falls into the efficient breach zone when the cost of providing
conforming products is disproportionate to the benefit of it in the hands
of the buyer.
123. CESL, supra note 14, arts. 88, 106.
124. See id. art. 172. Where a contract is avoided or terminated by either party, each
party is obliged to return what that party ("the recipient") has received from the other party.
The obligation to return what was received includes any natural and legal fruits derived
from what was received.
125. Id. arts. 110 3, 159.
126. Id. art. 160.
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Basically, the goods provided by a seller should be of the quantity,
quality, and description required by the contract; they should be
contained, packaged, and supplied along with any accessories or
instruction in the manner as required by the contract according to
Article 99 of the CESL. Article 100 further states seven criteria for
assessing non-conformity. Generally, the goods should comply with any
particular purpose made known to the seller at the time of the
conclusion of the contract and the usual or ordinary purpose for the
goods. 127 Moreover, Article 102 further requires that the goods be free
from any right or not obviously unfounded claim of a third party,
including rights or claims based on intellectual property. 128
According to the CESL, if the goods provided by a seller are not in
conformity with the contract, the consumer buyer may freely choose
remedies among a variety of options which include, requiring specific
performance, withholding the payment of the price, terminating
contract, reducing the price, and claiming damages. To be noted,
specific performance in the case of defective performance is present
either to repair the defects or to replace the defective goods with
conforming goods. Moreover, as is indicated in Article 111 (1 ), the
choice between repair and replacement is at the consumers will, 129
which carries the consumers free choice of remedies one step further. A
consumer buyer, thus, is able to make the choice of remedies based on
the relative benefit and cost of different remedies. 130 He may decide
whether or not to give the seller a chance to cure the defects and in
which way the seller should cure the defects according to his own
preference. Repair or replacement might be preferable if a consumer
thinks the value of the cured goods is great, for example because the
goods are unique or the market prices of the goods have gone up. 131
But once the consumer has validly required remedying the lack of
127. According to Article 100, the product must be in conformity with what has been
agreed to by the contractual parties. See id. art. 100. It should be fit for any particular
purpose made known to the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract, possess the
qualities of the product held out to the buyer as a sample or model and possess the qualities
indicated in any pre-contractual statement which forms part of the contract terms.
Moreover, Article 100 requires that the product provided by the seller comply with what has
been considered usual or reasonable. It should be fit for the purposes of ordinary use; be
contained or packaged in the manner usual or adequate for such goods or; be supplied along
with such accessories or instructions as the buyer may reasonably expect to receive; and
possess such qualities and performance capabilities as the buyer may expect. CESL, supra
note 14, art. 100.
128. Id. art. 102; see Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at 888.
129. CESL, supra note 14, art. 111 §1; Wagner, supra note 77, at 5.
130. Wagner, supra note 77, at 18.
131. Id.
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conformity by repair or replacement, he can not resort to other remedies
except for withholding payment within a reasonable time, not exceeding
thirty days.
Consider the CESL' s attitude toward the remedy of cure in the
situation when the contract falls into the efficient zone so that defective
performance has more economic efficient than offering conforming
goods. Except for setting general limits by Articles 88, 89 and 110, the
CESL adds more to the restriction of the buyer's choice of remedies
through Article 111. As is stated, a consumer's choice between repair
and replacement is hindered if the option chosen would be unlawful or
impossible, or would impose high costs on the seller compared to the
other option available. Article 111 provides three indicators to evaluate
whether the cost of cure is high or not, including: ( 1) the value of the
goods without a lack of conformity; (2) the significance of the lack of
conformity; and (3) whether the alternative remedy could be completed
without significant inconvenience to the consumer. According to the
doctrine of efficient breach, non-conforming performance is considered
efficient if the cost of providing conforming goods is so high that it
consumes all the benefit from it. The benefit yielded by offering
conforming goods, to some extent, can be measured in relation to the
criterion established in Article 111(1). For example, suppose consumer
X receives a product which was expected to be worth €800 and this
product was the last one offered in the shop owned by seller Y. If the
product contains defects and repairing it may cost the seller € 1,000;
then the net profit yield from cure would be -€200. In this situation,
cure is inefficient compared to other approaches available to the
consumer.
Although a consumer's claim for cure will not be supported by the
CESL if the contract falls into the efficient breach zone, the consumer
may still resort to other remedies. The application of remedies for the
consumer buyer is similar to that in the model of efficient non-delivery.
A consumer may choose to withhold his payment of price, terminate the
contract, reduce the price, or claim for expectation damages unless the
inconformity is excused. What needs to be specially mentioned in the
situation of lack of conformity is the remedy of price reduction. A
precondition for this remedy is that the consumer decides to accept the
non-conforming goods rather than terminating or rejecting it. In this
situation, the value of what has been received by the consumer is
disproportionate to the price set in the contract. Correspondingly, the
CELS entitles the consumer to reduce the price or recover the excess, in
proportion to "the decrease in the value of what was received in
performance at the time performance was made compared to the value
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of what would have been received by a conforming performance." 132
To be mentioned, price reduction works as an alternative to damages for
the decreased value of what has been received. 133 Hence, once a buyer
reduces the price, he cannot also claim for damages for the loss thereby
recovered, but he is only entitled to damages for any further loss
suffered. 134 To a certain extent, the amount of price reduction is
calculated by the similar measurement as what is applied in damage
calculation. According to Article 160 of the CESL, the amount of
damages should be equal to the discrepancy between the hypothetical
status that he would have enjoyed by receiving conforming products
( Ve =Value of the conforming product) and the actual status of him
when he receives the non-conforming products ( Vd =Value of the
defective product). The formula shows the relationship between the
price after reduction (P') and the price of the original contract (P). As is
shown, regardless of whether the expectation damages or price
reduction is awarded, the goal is to put the consumer in the position as if
he had received goods in conformity with the contract.

Vd/Vc = P'/P
C. Limits of the Application of Efficient Breach in Consumer Contracts
Efficient breach is possible in a legal framework where a seller will
not be forced to perform the contract specifically and the buyer will not
become worse off because of the non-performance if the contract falls
into the efficient breach zone. This framework of efficient breach
within the CESL is composed by the rules of "force majeure,"
"hardship," "impossibility and implacability," and remedies. Within
this framework, efficient non-performance from which the surplus is
greater than that from strict performance is possible, either in the form
of efficient non-delivery or efficient non-conformity. Nevertheless,
situations in real-world consumer sales are much more complicated.
Except for the legal rules, several other factors may have an influence
on the possibility of efficient breach in consumer contracts.
First, consider the possibility that specific performance is
impossible or costly. Take the model of efficient non-conformity as an
132. CESL, supra note 14, art. 120 1, 2.
133. As is indicated, the justification for price reduction is to prevent unjust
enrichment for partial failure of consideration and compensates the creditor for simply not
getting the full performance. It works partially as the simplified right to damages and as the
simplified right to partially terminate the contract. See CESL commentary, supra note 79, at
526-27.
134. CESL, supra note 14, art. 12013.
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example in which providing conforming goods is impossible or
extremely costly. As is indicated in Section 4.2, specific performance
in the case of lack of conformity is present as either repair or
replacement. Only when both types of specific performance are
impossible or extremely costly, namely when it is costly to either repair
the defect or make a replacement, is efficient breach assumed to be
possible. The cost of replacement depends on several factors, for
example, whether the object of the contract is a general product or a
unique product and the price of the product. In the premise of consumer
contract, especially in retailing contracts, firms in markets may optimize
over availability of different products according to the demand of
consumers. 135 Normally, with regard to general goods, such as the
brand of a laptop, a firm may have more than one item in stock.
Moreover, empirical studies show that "consumers are often willing to
buy substitute items in the same shop when faced with stock-out in
frequently purchased consumer market." 136 Therefore, even if there is a
sold-out problem, it might not be expensive for a seller to arrange an
alternative when it comes to general products. In contrast, in the case of
unique goods, such as works of art or antiques, it is impossible to find
close substitutes. 137
Second, the way of dispute resolution may also matter. As to the
way of avoiding specific performance, a seller may choose to not break
the contract unilaterally but to reach a settlement. For instance, he may
offer to make a new tender, reduce the price, or return the money paid
by the consumer back. From the standpoint of a consumer, he is willing
to choose the dispute resolution that is less costly, easier, or less timeconsuming. If we put the background to the cross-border purchasing,
the cost involved in suing a foreign trader is huge. Therefore, what
might be preferable to the consumer is also to reach a settlement with
the seller, by either price reduction or termination of the contract and
getting the money back rather than going to the court and suing for
monetary damages if the cost of litigation is taken into account.
Another issue involved in assessing the possibility of efficient
breach concerns the question of whether the remedies available to a
consumer buyer are adequate to make him indifferent between
135. Christopher Conlon & Julie Holland Mortimer, Effects of Product Availability:
Experimental Evidence (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16506, Oct.
2010).
136. Ravi Anupindi, Maqbool Dada & Sachin Gupta, Estimation of Consumer
Demand with Stock- out Based Substitution: An Application to Vending Machine Products,
17 MKTG. Sci. 406, 407 (1998).
137. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 320.
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performance and breach. To guarantee that the consumer's position will
not worsen within the efficient breach zone, the CESL offers him free
choice among a series of remedies including withholding performance,
terminating the contract, price reduction, and expectation damages. But
a crucial dimension to evaluate the adequacy of remedies is what the
buyer expects from the contract, namely the consumer's purpose of
buying. In consumer sales, the consumer's purpose of purchasing is
outside of his trade, business, craft, or profession. 138 Most of the time
this refers to individual use. In other words, consumers engage in
transactions not only for obtaining promises or compensation, but for
accomplishing instrumental goals, such as obtaining ownership, using
properties, and receiving services. "The fact that an act leads to good
consequences is irrelevant if it is wrong." 139 So whether a consumer's
expectation can be satisfied is closely correlated to whether a consumer
can obtain the concrete products. With regard to general goods, it is
easy for a consumer to find a substitute in the market. In theory, as long
as the buyer can make a substitutive transaction and what he can receive
from the breaching party covers the additional amount necessary to
purchase the substitute plus the cost of making a second transaction, the
buyer will be fully compensated. 140 However, since finding a close
substitute is not possible when the object of a contract is unique, what a
consumer expected from performing the contract cannot be fully
recovered if the contract is broken. In addition, consider the type of
losses defined by the CESL that are compensable. As is shown in
Section 3.2, the CESL only recognizes the non-economic loss in the
form of pain and suffering, but excludes other forms of impairment of
life and loss of enjoyment. Think of the "wedding dress" case, where
the loss that is actually suffered by the buyer is neither purely economic
loss nor any physical pain, but the enjoyment of wearing the exactly
same wedding dress that was bought. 141 No matter whether the "current
price" rule or "substitutive price" rule applies, what the buyer can
recover according to the CESL is merely the price difference not the
happiness that she would enjoy from wearing the expected dress in the
wedding. As long as the buyer is worse off due to the breach, it is
impossible for Pareto efficiency to take place and efficient breach can
hardly be created.
138. Reg. CESL, supra note 14, art. 2.
139. Avery W. Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 777,
787 (2012).
140. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 275
(1979).
141. CESL COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 644-45.
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Fourth, some special legal devices used for consumer protection
will also have an impact on the possibility of efficient breach by
influencing how contractual parties react to their on-going relationship
in the case where the contract falls into the efficient breach zone. One
example is warranty clauses written in the contract. In practice, many
firms attach a warranty to their products as their marketinf strategy 142 in
addition to the mandatory warranty required by the law. 1 3 A warranty
guarantees the consumer buyer can make claims against the producer,
supplier, retailer, or seller if the products delivered are not in conformity
with the contract within a specified period. For instance, it guarantees
repair, replacement, or money return under special situation. Suppliers,
moreover, use warranty clauses as one type of implicit insurance policy
since the non-conformity is uncertain and adverse. When drafting
warranty clauses, suppliers have to consider the probability and
expected cost of product defects as well as the corresponding
settlements ex-ante. 1 4 In this sense, warranty clauses make the contract
more complete and provide consumers with explicit information about
what he should do in the case where non-conformity is costly. As a
result, ex-post settlements are promoted.
Put all those considerations above together in relation to the
remedy rules offered by the CESL, efficient breach would take place in
a very limited frame. With regard to non-delivery, only in those
contracts involving future performance, is there space for efficient
breach to take place. Furthermore, the nature of the product has an
impact on the probability that the contract falls into the efficient breach
zone. It is more difficult to find replacement in the sales of unique
goods than in the sales of general goods. So the probability that a
contract falls into the efficient breach zone is higher when it comes to
unique goods. But the paradox is that consumers can hardly get full
compensation if the seller breaks a contract involving unique goods.
What is more, compared to a damage claim, private settlement is
assumed to be preferable to both consumers and sellers in solving

142. A warranty might be imposed by law or created by contract. See Stefan Haupt, An
Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection in Contract Law, 4. GER. L.J. 1137, 1155
(2003).
143. For instance, the European Union imposed a mandatory warranty for consumer
sales through the directive 1999/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and
associated guarantees. See Council & Parliament Directive 1999/44/EC, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L
171) 12.
144. In exchange of warranties, suppliers will also increase the price of the products
proportionally "because the promised measures are costly for the seller". See Haupt, supra
note 142, at 1155-56.
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conflicts, if the under-compensation problem and transaction cost are
taken into account.
Put the other way around, situation will be different if efficient
breach is assumed to be committed by the consumer buyer. First, the
criterion for termination of the contract is lenient for the consumer. As
provided by Article 114(2) of the CESL, if there is a defect in the
product delivered by the seller, a consumer may terminate the contract
unless the defect is insignificant. 145 In this case, a consumer has more
freedom in choosing to get rid of the contract when he thinks the value
from performing it decreases. Second, Article 132(2) provides buyers
an exception to the obligation to make the payment. As is stated,
"where the buyer has not yet taken over the goods and it is clear that the
buyer will be unwilling to receive performance, the seller may
nonetheless require the buyer to take delivery, and may recover the
price, unless the seller could have made a reasonable substitute
transaction without significant effort or expense." 146 In many consumer
transactions, products provided by a seller are standardized and it would
not be difficult for the seller to arrange an alternative transaction by
selling the products to others. The seller, in those occasions, cannot
require the other party to take over the delivery and make the payment.
What is more, the CESL entitles consumers the right to withdraw the
contract without giving any reason and at no cost within a certain period
after the conclusion of the contract (fourteen days). 147 Accordingly,
after a contract is formed, its binding power is comparatively weaker.
The consumer can easily get out of a contract if he gets a much more
lucrative opportunity or thinks it is wasteful to buy the product from the
original seller.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A starting point taken in this paper is that contract parties should
not be forced to perform the contract when non-performance leads to
wealth-maximisation. Rather than to defend expectation damages or to
encourage breach, the function of the efficient breach theory, as is
suggested in this paper, is to assess the approaches to motivating
contract parties to perform the contract unless strictly performing it is
not as profitable as what was expected at the time of contract formation.
The CESL takes the position that encouraging performance of
the contract and cooperation between consumers and sellers through a
145. CESL, supra note 14, art. 114 2.
146. Id. art. 132 2.
147. Id. art. 41-43.
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variety of rules including a performance rule, an information rule, and a
damage rule. For example, motivating information exchange and
establishing the criteria for damage measurement may facilitate the
seller to assess the price for non-performance. But the CESL also opens
a window for efficient breach with the aim of avoiding economically
wasteful performance. When drawing the border of the efficient breach
zone, the CESL compares the cost of performance with the surplus that
the parties are expected to obtain from the contract. According to the
CESL, specific performance is not allowed within the efficient breach
zone, but other options of remedy including withholding performance,
terminating the contract, price reduction and expectation damages are
available to consumers. In addition, the CESL takes the concern of risk
allocation into account as well, by making the seller who is assumed to
bear the risk of non-performance pay damages. Among other remedies,
the CESL offers the consumer a free choice of remedy, especially
presenting in the consumers right to terminate the contract in the case of
non-performance. Most importantly, under the premise of consumer
sales, the emphasis is placed on how to guarantee that a consumer's
position will not worsen because of the non-performance, rather than on
how to avoid wasteful performance. This could be understood if the
issue of consumer protection is taken into consideration. More research
is needed in relation to balancing on the one hand how to shape the
seller's incentive to take an optimal level of performance and on the
other hand how to protect a consumer's expectation from the
transaction.
The CESL, nevertheless, also has its shortages in relation to the
issue of optimal incentives to breach, negotiate or perform. In terms of
damage rules, the CESL excludes non-economic losses in the form of
impairment of life and loss of enjoyment, which commonly arises in the
case of consumer contract. Provided that there is no current market
price to evaluate the buyer's loss, it is difficult to make an accurate
calculation of contract damages. Moreover, within the efficient breach
zone, the CESL' s imposition of the obligation to negotiate is opaque
and unnecessary. On the one hand, the CESL mentions that to
renegotiate is the parties' duty, but it does not indicate clearly the
consequences of a violation of this duty. On the other hand, by making
the failure to reach negotiations within a certain period as the
prerequisite for the court's interference the CESL imposes an
unnecessary burden on the contracting parties. In the circumstance
where reaching an agreement via negotiations is costly, the parties
should be able to go to court directly. Moreover, what has been
neglected by the CESL is the possibility of breach with the aim of
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pursuing a higher economic surplus. The CESL doesn't show
expressively whether it allows or prohibits these types of breaches.
What we can infer from the provisions in the CESL is that the seller is
generally obliged to perform and the seller is entitled to specific
performance even if there is a more lucrative opportunity offered by a
third party. Paradoxically, in any circumstance where the outside bidder
has obtained the right to the good according to property law, the
damages that the buyer may claim is the expectation damages. In this
sense, the seller has the incentive to breach the contract as long as he
can still obtain an economic surplus after paying expectation damages.
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